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CERTAINTY IN CONTRACTS
That the question of certainty in the law of contracts is
not one of merely academic interest is shown by the fact that
the Decennial Digest for the decade ending in 1926 gives us no
less than eighty-nine American decisions, nine of them in the
state courts of New York alone, wherein the question of cer-
tainty was a vital, if not a determining factor. One can merely
guess at the number of unreported cases and unlitigated con-
troversies wherein certainty has been a matter of importance.
Furthermore, in practice, there is probably no defense more
frequently resorted to when an alleged agreement has been
broken that the plea that the contract in question is so vague and
uncertain in its terms that it is unenforceable; in other words,
that the parties have never really come to any agreement.
There appears to be no escape from the fact that the term
certainty is a relative, not an absolute term, as used in this
connection. Thus, the courts have repeatedly declared that the
thing required is "reasonable" certainty.1 The intention of the
parties must be ascertainable to a "reasonable degree of cer-
tainty ". 2 In the field of philosophy, also, certainty has a relative
rather than an absolute connotation. Hence we find in Bald-
win''s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology that "certitude
or certainty" is defined as a term "employed to express degrees
of conviction or belief. It is applied to all cases from a slight
tendency to accept a proposition or fact up to complete certitude
or knowledge. Certain authorities limit certitude to the higbest
degrees of assurance, where the possibility of doubt is
excluded."
Is there one rule of certainty at law and another in equity ?
Suggestions to this effect are not wanting. In Oregon, the
Supreme Court has said that "less particularity is required in
the terms of an agreement where the proceeding is not a suit in
equity but an action at law". 3 And the New York Court of
Appeals is authority for the rule that a contract, to be specifi-
'Price v. Stipek, 39 Mlont. 426, 104 Pac. 195 (1909) ; Central Mort-
gage Co. v. Mich. State Life Ins. Co., 43 Okl. 33, 143 Pac. 175 (1914);
De Pauw Univ. v. Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 166 Pac. 1148 (1917).
2 United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. . 527
(1900).
3 Olympia Bottling Wks. v. Olympia Brew. Co., 56 Ore. 87, 107 Pac.
969 (1910).
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cally enforced must be certain and that, if it is not, "the
plaintiff in such a case will be left to his remedy in an action for
damages". 4 Ifikewise, the Supreme Court in Virginia quotes
with apparent approval the following statement from Ruling
Case Law :5 "Where the relief sought is specific execution, it is
essential that the contract itself should be specific. In other
words, the certainty required must extend to all the particulars
essential to the enforcement of the contract. But where there
has been an entire breach, and compensation is asked in damages,
it may be sufficient if there be certainty only as to the general
scope and stipulations of the contract. It may well be doubted,
however, whether there has been any practical recognition of
any such distinction by the courts. However, the law does not
favor, but leans against, the destruction of contracts because of
uncertainty".3 It will be seen that the above evasive and self-
contradictory statement gives some support to a distinction in
this connection and it must be admitted that the rule of cer-
tainty in the law of damages is quite a different thing from
certainty in the formation of a contract. Furthermore, there is
no question but that damages may often be recovered at law on
the basis of quasi-contractual liability after part performance
of an alleged contract which is void for uncertainty. 7 Aside
from these considerations, neither of which is concerned with
the question of certainty in the formation of a contract, there
is no basis for any distinction between law and equity on this
matter of certainty. Hence, the words of Miller, J., in an early
cases seem to be entirely sound: "It is inferable from the lan-
guage used in reference to the degree of certainty required by
courts of equity in order to induce them to compel specific per-
formance of a contract that a greater degree of certainty is
required than is necessary to render valid a contract in the courts
of law. But I do not think that any such distinction was in-
tended. The rules of construction are the same in both courts;
and no reason can be assigned for demanding a greater degree of
certainty in the one court than in the other."
4 Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. Y. 192, 200 (1874).
'6 R. C. L. 644.
'Mamss-Owens Co. v. Owens, 129 Va. 183, 105 S. E. 543 (1921).
"See Hopedale Elee. Co. v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 132 App. Div.
348, 116 N. Y. Supp. 859 (1909), aff'd 198 N. Y. 588, 92 N. E. 1086
(1910).8Foot v. Webb, 59 Barb. 38 (N. Y. 1866).
CERTAINTY IN CONTRACTS
An examination will now be made of the leading principles
in connection with the problem of certainty, and more particu-
larly of the New York decisions.
1. The fact that extrinsic evidence must be resorted to in
order to ascertain the extent of the rights and liabilities of the
parties under the contract does not render it void for uncer-
tainty. For example, an agreement to furnish all the coal needed
by a vessel during a certain year at a certain price per ton is not
void for uncertainty, merely because extrinsic evidence is
necessary to determine the number of tons required.9 Likewise,
a promissory note made payable thirty days or at any other
fixed time after the maker's death is clearly not void for uncer-
tainty though the time of the death must be fixed by extrinsic
evidence. Furthermore, an agreement between a sub-contractor
and contractor as to work on a building to be subsequently con-
tracted for between the contractor and a school board is bind-
ing.10 In this case, no doubt, the first agreement would fail for
lack of definiteness if the second turned out to be indefinite.
This is illustrated by another situation wherein the parties
agreed upon the giving of a ninety-nine year lease on the usual
terms in such cases. When it was later established that there
was no usual form in such cases in that locality, the entire
agreement failed for want of certainty.11  Moreover, there are
many instances of utter incompleteness and obvious uncertainty
which can not be cured by extrinsic evidence. Thus, an agree-
ment to pay for services a sum not exceeding three hundred
dollars a week is so utterly and palpably vague that parol proof
can not be resorted to.1 2 "If the meaning of an instrument is
uncertain, the intention may be ascertained by extrinsic testi-
mony, but it must be distinctly derived from a fair and rational
interpretation of the words actually used. If it be incompatible
with such inferpretation the instrument will be void for uncer-
tainty and incurable inaccuracy."' 3 A blank left in an instru-
ment where a vital term of the agreement should have been
inserted is so obviously incomplete and therefore uncertain that
Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142 (1891).
'
0 Blanei; v. Hoke, 14 Ohio St. 292 (1863).
Gold-stine v. Tolman, 157 Wis. 141, 147 N. W. 7 (1914).
-United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527
(1900).
Miller, J., in Calkins v. Falk, 39 Barb. 620, 624 (1862), aff'd
1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 291, 38 How. Pr. 62 (1869).
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extrinsic evidence can not be invoked to supply the gap. Hence,
a promise to pay another dollars is of no consequence
in law and parol evidence is of no avail.14
2. In many instances, a contract is saved from the sea of
uncertainty by what are known as "implications of law" or the
supplying of omitted terms by construction. Hence, a contract
to pay for services cannot be attached for uncertainty because
the compensation is not fixed in the contract itself. The law
will imply that a reasonable charge was intended.' 5 And the
same is equally true where the contract leaves the door open for
future controversy by expressly stipulating that services are to
be paid for by the giving of a "reasonable compensation ".16
The same rule holds where words which are equivalent to a
provision for reasonable compensation are used. Thus, an agree-
ment to pay what is "right" and "satisfactory" has been held
to be enforceable as an agreement merely to pay what is just
under the eircumstances.' 7 However, it must be admitted that
we are here perilously near to the danger zone where certainty
leaves off and uncertainty begins. This may be illustrated by
the two cases following. In Massachusetts, the contract of a
chemist who agrees to employ his time and skill for "a fair and
equitable share of the net profits" of the business is not too
indefinite to be enforceable, at least in so far as it has been
executed.1s But in New York, a promise to pay a "fair share"
of the profits of a business is too indefinite to be enforceable.' 9
The court declared, "A fair share of the defendant's profits
may be any amount from a nominal sum to a material part
according to the particular views of the person whose guess is
considered. Such an executory contract must rest for perform-
ance upon the honor and good faith of the parties making it. "20
Is this point well taken? Who on earth would call a nominal
sum a fair share? And why should a fair share not be a material
part? The fact that views of different persons may be at
variance is equally true where a reasonable sum is involved.
14 Vandervoort v. Dewey, 42 Hun. 68 (N. Y. 1886); Eaton v. Wilcox,
42 Hun. 61 (N. Y. 1886), rev'd on other grounds sub nora Eaton v.
Allegheny Gas Co., 122 N. Y. 416, 25 N. E. 981 (1890).
1'Perkins v. Hasbrouck, 155 Pa. 494, 26 Atl 695 (1893).
l' Wehner v. Bauer, 160 Fed. 240.
"Silver v. Graves, 210 Mass. 26, 95 N. E. 948 (1911).
"Noble v. Joseph Burnett Co.. 208 Mass. 75, 94 N. E. 289 (1911).
9Varney v. Ditmnars, 217 N. Y. 223, 111 N. E. 822 (1916).
2 Chase J., at page 228.
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Guessing, it is submitted, is just as much in evidence in determin-
ing what is reasonable as in deciding what is fair. And is there
any material difference in such matters between the terms fair
and reasonable? Honesty, justice and sweetness, to borrow
Matthew Arnold's epithet, are as much the attributes of the one
as the other. Let us pass now to the position of the same court
five years later in Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co. 21 Here,
the defendant sold the plaintiff a quantity of cloth at a certain
price per yard and agreed to give the plaintiff the "privilege
to confirm more of the above if [the defendant] can get
more." The five judges of the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, were unanimous in condemning the above clause as in-
definite and uncertain. Greenbaum, J., denounced it as such,
pointing out that "it fails to state what quantity of goods
plaintiff is entitled to buy under the exercise of its privilege. It
does not appear whether the option is limited to as many pieces
of the goods as defendant might 'be able to procure, or only to as
many as plaintiff cares to avail itself of. It is uncertain as to
the limit of time during which the privilege is to be exercised.
Is the privilege to continue for a week, a month, a year, a life-
time'? May it be exercised once, or as often as plaintiff wishes?
It is also silent as to the price at which plaintiff is entitled to
exercise its option.''22 As thus interpreted by the Appellate
Division, how could any agreement be more uncertain than the
one before it? Yet the Court of Appeals, notwithstanding the
fact that the word "fair" in Varney v. Ditmars2 3 caused it to
condemn that agreement for uncertainty, held the agreement in
Cohen v. Lurie Woolen C0.24 to be sufficiently certain to be
enforced. Cardozo, J., declared that the seeming uncertainties
as to subject-matter, time and place were not impenetrable.
"They will be found to be unreal. It is said that we cannot tell
whether the buyer, in exercising the option, must make demand
for all that the seller can supply, or is free to call for less. We
think the implication plain that the buyer is to fix the quantity,
subject only to the proviso that quantity shall be limited by
ability to supply. It is said the option does not state the time
within which election is to be announced. We think a reasonable
232 N. Y. 112, 133 N. E. 370 (1921).
197 App. Div. 797, 189 N. Y. Supp. 380 (1921).
3Supra, note 19.
" Supra, note 21.
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time is a term implied by law. . . . It is said the option
does not embody a statement of the price. We think a 'privi-
lege to confirm more' imports a privilege to confirm at the price
of the initial quantity." Crane, J., alone of the seven judges
dissented from the opinion. And it is worth noting that Car-
dozo, J., who wrote the opinion in Cohen v. Lurie Woolen Co.25
dissented in Varney v. Ditmars2 6 on this matter of certainty. If
both of these cases are sound and consistent, several curious con-
sequences follow. An employer who promises a workman a fair
share of the profits of the business is not bound to keep his
promise, though he may be held to his agreement if he merely
promises a share of the profits or a reasonable share of the
profits. The law is willing to supply omissions of time, quantity
and price, where none of these is mentioned and will imply that
all are to be reasonable, but if any one of these is expressly
designated as "fair", the whole agreement falls to the ground
for lack of certainty. Since the above decisions were handed
down, Cardozo, J., has expressly followed Varney v. Ditnars,27
from which opinion, it will be recalled, he dissented, and has
held that a promise to pay "an appropriate percentage" of the
benefits, if any, accruing from the labor of an employe, in addi-
tion to regular wages, is too indefinite to be enforceable as more
than a promise to pay the reasonable value of the services
rendered. 28 In other words, the plaintiff was denied the
recovery of his stipulated wages as a minimum plus a portion of
the benefits in question and was confined to a recovery merely
of the reasonable value of the work performed. The court
declared, "The case is to 'be disposed of as founded on a common
count for service rendered at request." This means that the
word "appropriate" has followed into limbo the word "fair".
In Varney v. Ditmars,29 no recovery could have been had in
quasi-contract for work performed for the reason that but little,
if any, had been performed. In Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen
Co.,30 the court said that the option in question "was drawn by
merchants. We are persuaded that merchants reading it would
not be doubtful of its meaning. It was meant to accomplish
25 Supra, note 21.
- Stpra, note 19, at 233.
Supra, note 19.
Von Reitzenstein v. Tomlinson, 249 N. Y. 60, 162 N. E. 584 (1928).
Supra, note 19.
Supra, note 21.
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something." But was not the same thing true in the other two
cases? Was not the promise of a share of the profits intended to
stimulate the efforts of the workmen? And is it not fair to
assume that it had the desired effect? Let us discuss the matter
no further, reminding ourselves only that what is fair and
appropriate is very different in legal effect from what is reason-
able or devoid of any qualifying word.
3. Though an agreement may be void at the outset by
reason of some element of uncertainty in it, the agreement may
become binding when the uncertain element has been rendered
certain. Hence, a contract calling for the conveyance of land
but containing a defective description of it may be made binding
by the subsequent location of the land and the procuring of a
plot and survey thereof.-3 Likewise, where machinery is pur-
chased subject to a test the terms of which are to be agreed
upon, when the parties subsequently agree upon the terms of
the test the element of uncertainty disappears from the original
agreement. 32
4. Though a contract is void for uncertainty and hence is
not binding in so far as it is executory, if benefits have been
conferred by one of the parties upon the other in pursuance of
the agreement believed to exist, recovery will be allowed in
quasi-contract for the reasonable value of such benefits.33 This
proposition is so just and beyond dispute that further discussion
is unnecessary. Obviously, the contract can not be enforced by
either party, but this is a different matter from the receipt of
benefits thereunder and allowing the party benefited to escape
all liability.
in conclusion and by way of summary, it may be said that
the law does not require mathematical or absolute certainty in
the terms of a contract to make it enforceable. The written
document must express clearly the intention of the parties, but
there is no rule of law which requires it to be a work of art.3 4
If there were a distinction between the certainty required at law
and in equity, it would, of course, be necessary to have two rules
",Mills v. MeLanahan, 70 W. Va. 288, 73 S. E. 927 (1912).
"'Hopedale Electric Co. v. Electric Storage Co., 96 App. Div. 344,
89 N. Y. Supp. 325 (1904), aff'd 184 N. Y. 356, 77 N. E. 394 (1906).
United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527
(1900).
"Jackson v. Rogers, 111 S. C. 49, 96 S. E. 692 (1918).
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on the subject. But such distinction appears to be without
foundation in reason or on authority. It is not necessary that
the intention of the parties be fully determinable from an
examination of the instrument which they have signed. The
necessity of certainty does not preclude the resort to extrinsic
evidence, if only the contractual obligation is certain when such
evidence is resorted to. It is by reason of the power of the
courts to invoke implications of law and the uncertainty in the
application of rules of construction that much of the litigation
over the question of uncertainty has resulted. If, in the cases of
Varney v. Ditmars3 5 and Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co.,30
the parties could have determined the matters of construction
and implication in advance, the litigation might have been
avoided. But this it is impossible to do. These are matters
which must inevitably be left to the decision of the court in each
case. Our perplexity in these situations is evidenced by the
decisions cited above wherein we learn that "reasonable" is
unobjectionable on the ground of certainty, though "fair" and
"appropriate" axe fatal., Many other words, such as "just",
"honest", "decent", "satisfactory", and the like, might be
suggested, though we may be compelled to confess our inability
to say what treatment they will receive by the courts. The lack
of certainty at the outset may be removed and that which is
uncertain rendered certain by the subsequent course of conduct
of the parties. In this case, an enforceable contract comes into
existence only when the ambiguity is removed Finally, be it
noted that uncertainy is often an effective obstacle to recovery
in the case of the executory contract alone. After execution on
One side, recovery in quasi-contract is possible when benefit has
been conferred and such recovery is frequently the same in
dollars and cents as a recovery on the original and express
contract would have amounted to, but for the defect of un-
certainty.
More recently the New York Court of Appeals has handed
down another decision on the question of certainty, namely the
case of Nassau Supply Co. v. Ice Service Co. 3 7 It appears that
the defendant, the Ice Service Co., had agreed to sell to the
plaintiff, the Supply Co., one hundred tons of ice each day for
3Supra, note 19.
18 Supra, note 21.
"252 N. Y. 277 (1929).
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a calendar year at a stated price, and the Supply Co. agreed to
purchase from the Ice Co. "all the ice used by them up to one
hundred tons. Payments for same daily." Crane, J., delivered
the unanimous opinion of the court affirming the judgment of
the Appellate Division, first department, which reversed a judg-
ment for the plaintiff and dismissed the complaint. The court
declared that "on the face of this paper agreement there appears
to be a sufficient consideration for a contract, or, in other words,
mutual binding promises, a mutuality of consideration." But
the court held that the contract implies certain things, at least
that the purchaser at the time of performance would use ice as a
going concern and that a supply had to be furnished on or about
the time set for performance to begin up to the termination
of the contract. The exact language of the court is, "We do not
mean to say that the failure to take ice every day would be a
breach of the contract. What we do say is that these words
carry with them the idea of something substantial; convey the
meaning that the plaintiff was a business enterprise in existence,
using ice which, in the contemplation of the parties, might be
required daily." The court then proceeded to give a summary
of the facts in the case, the important points being as follows:
That the Supply Co. was not in the ice business but the coal
business; that when it made the contract it had no use for ice
and might never have any use for it; that it had no place of
business at the address given in the contract; that it had no
license to engage in the retail ice business and was not engaged
in such business; that when the time set for performance arrived,
namely May 1, 1924, the plaintiff ordered no ice nor had any
use for ice; that the plaintiff ordered no ice until the latter part
of June when it asked the defendant to sell ice to one Williams
who had purchased ice from the defendant but had been refused
further credit. The plaintiff, however, agreed to pay for -uch
ice supplied to Williams. The plaintiff claimed that it had taken
over Williams' business. The court emphasizes the fact that,
both at the time the contract was made and when performance
was to begin, there was no trade or custom or use or demand or
business existing which would in any way whatever measure a
supply, a requirement or a need. "There was no fact or circum-
stance by which the use or need of the plaintiff's requirements
could be measured or made reasonably certain. In all the New
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York cases cited, where a contract has been [made] to supply
goods for the needs or requirements of another's business, there
has been a going business with the need of a supply and it was
only the uncertainty as to the extent of this need or the amount
of the supply required which was left for future determina-
tion." In conclusion, the court said, "We find that the intention
of these parties was that the seller agreed to sell and the buyer
to take the buyer's normal or ordinary needs up to the limit
mentioned subject to the variation of its business. This is not
a case where the buyer agrees to take all that he may sub-
sequently want or may choose to buy, or the promise of a buyer
not to buy except from a particular seller. We would then have
a different question. . . . The Nassau Supply Co., Inc., as
before stated, impliedly represented that it was either in the ice
business or would be in the ice business with a market for ice in
May or June, and would require ice daily, not to exceed one
hundred (100) tons. It was not in such business, did not estab-
lish such business and made no bona fide demand for any ice
under its contract. In other words it had no need for ice."
Without going outside of the court's opinion, this decision
leaves much room for comment. It is true that a coal company
pure and simple has no need for ice. No ice is needed to keep the
coal from spoiling or burning in the summer time. But what is
more common in these days when unemployment is so much to
be avoided than a company which keeps its workers engaged in
delivering coal in winter and supplying ice in summer? Climate
makes the one the complement of the other. It mcy be true that
the Supply Co. had no need for ice when the contract was made
and might never have any, but is there any reason for suspect-
ing its motives in taking over Williams' business? It may be,
as the court says, that Williams had but three or four wagons
though the extent of his business did not appear. Let us remem-
ber that one hundred tons a day was merely the maximum, not
the minimum. Doubtless in many of these cases, the maximum
is never demanded on any day. Furthermore, the fact that a
maximum was fixed is an element certainly not present in many
of the cases wherein the contract has been held sufficiently
-ertain.
The next question raised but which is not now discussed is
this,-What effect has the giving of a fictitious address by a
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party to a contract? Does this in itself give the other party the
right to treat the contract as at an end, if he calls at this address
and cannot locate his co-contractor?
We dismiss as indeed a matter of very minor importance
the fact that the Supply Co. had no license to engage in the
retail ice business. What is there that can be obtained with
less difficulty than such a license?
It is admitted that before the end of the second month of
this twelve-month contract, the plaintiff asked the defendant to
supply ice to Williams and debit the plaintiff. Is it not possible
that the first month may have been a cold one when the ice busi-
ness was dull; that the plaintiff may have spent the month of
lay looking about as to the best way of starting up the ice
business? Clearly there is no objection to having the ice deliv-
ered to Williams provided only that the plaintiff is willing to
pay for it. How can there possibly be any legal objection to my
having some one else call for merchandise which I have pur-
chased? And may not the best way of getting started in the
business be by means of taking over the business of an estab-
lished dealer whose financial position is none too stable? Is
there not greater certainty in respect to need when an estab-
lished business is taken over than when the business is started
from the ground up?
The court emphasizes the fact that in the earlier New York
cases wherein agreements of the character now under discussion
have been upheld, there was already a going business with the
need of a supply. If this is to be the basis for our distinction
between such agreements which are enforceable and those which
are not, we cannot escape the conclusion that whether the agree-
ment is void for uncertainty or not cannot be determined from
the face of the contract itself. We must inquire in the surround-
ing circumstances, particularly with reference to the nature of
the plaintiff's business and determine whether it is a going
concern or not.
The court says, "This is not a case where the buyer agrees
to take all that he may subsequently want or may choose to buy,
or the promise of a buyer not to buy except from a particular
seller". It must be confessed that we cannot see how the court
arrived at these conclusions unless it has erroneously quoted the
contract earlier in its opinion. The plaintiff "agrees to purchase
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from the said Ice Service Co., Inc., all the ice used by them up
to (100) One Hundred tons". The court says, if this were the
case, "We would then have a different question". This it is
difficult to explain. Was it not the very question before the
court ?
The court also says that the Nassau Supply Co. was not in
the ice business, "did not establish such business and made no
bona fide demand for any ice under its contract. In other words
it had no need for ice." Here again, the opposite conclusion
seems possible. Did not the Supply Co. establish an ice business
by taking over that of Williams? Why question the bona fides
,of the demand for ice so long as the Supply Co. expressed its
willingness to pay for it? And what more is necessary to estab-
lish a need for ice than a demand for the same? From aught
that appears, the only objection of the defendant to Williams
was based on his inability to pay his bills. This element seems
to have been supplied by the plaintiff.
This decision is, in the main, in line with the earlier deci-
sions of Wells v. Alexandre3s and Schleget Mfg. (o. v. Cooper's
Glue Factory.3 9 However, it appears to add this limitation to
these earlier decisions: while an agreement to purchase all of an
article needed in a certain business during a certain time in
consideration of the seller's agreeing to supply such articles at a
stated price is not void for uncertainty if the purchaser during
the time of performance is a going concern in need of the article
in question, such an agreement is void for lack of certainty if
the purchaser has no such business when performance is to begin,
though the agreement may be saved from the objection of un-
certainty if the purchaser, very shortly after performance begins,
makes a bona fide attempt to establish a going concern in need
of the article in question. It would indeed be rash to assert
that, as time goes on, the rule of certainty is itself becoming
more simple or certain.
HENRY W. HUMBLE.
Brooklyn Law School.
Supra, note 9.
231 N. Y. 459, 132 N. E. 148, 24 A. L. R. 1348 (1921).
